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purposes where land was managed by professional farm
management firm).
8 I.R.C. § 6166(b)(1).  See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 8133015, April 29,
1981 (decedent incapacitated; farm managed by spouse under
crop share lease).
9 See n. 7 supra.
10 See Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173.
11 Pub. L. 93-368, amending 26 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1).
12 I.R.C. §§ 2032A(e)(6), 1402(a)(1).
13 I.R.C. § 1402.
14 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(b)(2)(ii).
15 I.R.C. § 469.
16 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3).
17 I.R.C. § 11.
18 I.R.C. § 1375(a).
19 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-2(c)(5)(B).
21 Ltr. Rul. 9003056, Oct. 26, 1989.  See Rev. Rul. 61-112, 1961-
1 C.B. 399.
22 Kennedy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1974-149.
23 Ltr. Rul. 9122055, March 5, 1991.  See, e.g., City Markets, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 433 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1970).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtors had leased dairy cows from
the creditor under contract. Over the several years of the
contract relationship, the parties kept an informal and often
inaccurate account of the number of cows under the lease.
The creditor terminated the lease and recovered most of the
cows and sued for damages for the missing cows. A state
court judgment awarded the creditor damages and the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. The creditor sought to have the
judgment declared nondischargeable under Sections
523(a)(4), (6). The court held that the debt was
dischargeable because (1) the lease did not give rise to a
fiduciary relationship as required by Section 523(a)(4) and
(2) the loss of the cows, while a breach of contract, was
more the result of sloppy accounting over the years by both
parties than embezzlement or larceny as required by Section
523(a)(6). In re Hoffman, 5 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 1993),
aff’g unrep. D.Ct. dec. aff’g, 144 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D.
N.D. 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY. In 1972, the debtor and
nondebtor spouse purchased a house which became
community property. In 1976, the parties transmuted
ownership by quitclaim deed to ownership as joint tenants.
The house was sold by the bankruptcy trustee and the
nondebtor spouse sought one-half of the proceeds. The court
held that the quitclaim deed raised a presumption of joint
tenancy which was not rebutted by the trustee; therefore, the
nondebtor spouse was to receive one-half of the proceeds of
the house. In re Gorman, 159 B.R. 543 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1993).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors sought to avoid a
judicial lien against their residence although the debtors had
no equity in the residence at the time of the bankruptcy
filing or the avoidance action. The debtors argued that the
exemption was impaired to the extent any post-confirmation
appreciation might occur. The court held that the debtor’s
exemption right and the impairment must be determined at
the time of the bankruptcy filing; therefore, the lien was not
avoidable because the lien did not impair any current right
to an exemption. In re Sheaffer, 159 B.R. 758 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1993).
COURT AWARDS. The debtors were not allowed an
exemption, under N.Y. Debtor & Creditor Law § 282(iii)(3),
for the portion of a jury award for pain and suffering in a
personal injury action. In re Romagno, 159 B.R. 439
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1993).
IRA. The court held that the exemption for an IRA, Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 21.090, was not unconstitutional as an
unreasonable impairment of contracts in existence before
the passage of the exemption. In re Seltzer, 159 B.R. 329
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
TRUSTEE.  The debtors’ estate included a fully
equipped dairy farm which was to be liquidated in the
Chapter 7 case. The trustee received an offer to purchase the
whole farm with equipment but before the sale could be
approved, a creditor with a security interest in the milking
equipment repossessed the equipment in violation of the
automatic stay. The buyer reduced the offer price but before
that offer could be approved, more equipment was
improperly removed and the farm was eventually sold at
foreclosure, leaving a deficiency claim. The original offer
would have satisfied all liens and given the debtors equity
for an exemption. The court held that the trustee has the
duty to act expeditiously in disposing of estate assets in the
best interests of the debtors and creditors. The court held
that the trustee did act expeditiously and that the eight
month delay from the first offer to the final petition for court
approval was caused primarily by the delays of the debtors
and interested creditors. The court remanded on the issue of
whether the trustee breached the fiduciary duty to preserve
the estate by failing to prevent the removal of equipment. In
re Hutchinson, 5 F.3d 750 (4th Cir. 1993), aff’g in part
and rem’g in part, 132 B.R. 827 (M.D. N.C. 1991), on
remand from, 819 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1987).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. After the Chapter 12 plan
payments had been completed and the debtors filed for a
discharge, the trustee and a creditor objected that all
disposable income had not been paid to the trustee. The
trustee argued that (1) the debtors’ living expenses were
unreasonably high and far exceeded the projected expenses,
(2) the debtors’ income should include the profit from the
sale of an automobile, an ultra-light aircraft and farm
equipment, (3) the debtors’ income should include money
borrowed to buy farm equipment not necessary for the
operation, and (4) disposable income included money
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invested in another business. The court held that (1) the
debtors’ personal living expenses in excess of a 5 percent
annual increase were not reasonably necessary and was be
included in disposable income, (2) the profit from the sale of
assets owned during the bankruptcy case were included in
disposable income, (3) the investment in the hog business
was included in disposable income because the debtors
failed to show the need for the investment, and (4) the
money used for the equipment purchases was not included
in disposable income because the purchases were within the
reasonable expectations of operating a farm. In re Gage,
159 B.R. 272 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1993).
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY . Without obtaining
prior court permission, the Chapter 12 debtors sold topsoil
from their farm. The creditor with a security interest in the
farm sought an injunction against the sales and applied for
relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the security
interest. The debtors asked for permission to sell the topsoil
and stated that the proceeds would be used to make periodic
payments on the secured debt. The court denied the
permission to sell the topsoil because the debtor had not
accurately accounted for all business transactions and sold
the topsoil in cash transactions without use of a bank
account or other record. The creditor was granted relief
from the automatic stay because the debtor had not proposed
a confirmable plan in over five years and could not
demonstrate that a confirmable plan was possible. In re
Watford, 159 B.R. 597 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03[3].*
ELIGIBILITY. The court held that the debtors were not
eligible for Chapter 13 because their total noncontingent,
liquidated unsecured debt exceeded $100,000 which
included a claim for back taxes and penalties on those taxes.
In re Maxfield, 159 B.R. 587 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
    FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. While the debtor's
case was still in Chapter 11, the debtor obtained approval
for loans from a creditor in exchange for superpriority of
that creditor in the funds. The funds were used to keep the
debtor's businesses going so that they could be sold as going
concerns. During this period, the businesses incurred
additional employment tax liability which was not paid.
After the case was converted to Chapter 7, the IRS filed a
claim for the employment taxes, interest and penalties and
sought priority under Section 506(c) as to the borrowed
funds because the nonpayment of the taxes helped preserve
the businesses. The court held that the IRS was entitled to
priority as to the unpaid taxes and as to the interest and
penalties. U.S. v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Kansas
City, 5 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g in part and rev’g
in part, 142 B.R. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS held an undersecured
tax lien claim against the debtor and the debtor sought to
avoid the unsecured portion of the claim. The court held that
under Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), the
unsecured portion of an allowed claim was not avoidable. In
re Rombach, 159 B.R. 311 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
The debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy within 240
days after the IRS had made assessments for taxes for 1982,
1983, and 1984.  The debtors obtained a dismissal of the
case one and a half years later and refiled 58 days after the
dismissal.  The court held that the taxes retained their
priority status because the 240 day limitation under Section
507(a)(7)(a) was extended by I.R.C. § 6503(b) until six
months after the dismissal of the first bankruptcy case. In re
West, 5 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 137 B.R. 1012 (D.
Or. 1992), 137 B.R. 1016 (D. Or. 1992).
CLAIMS. The IRS had filed timely claims for personal
income taxes owed by the debtors for certain tax years. The
IRS filed untimely amended claims for personal taxes for
the same and different tax years and for payroll taxes
resulting from the debtors’ business. The court held that the
amended claims for payroll taxes were not allowed because
the claims were for sufficiently different types of of taxes.
The IRS also argued that the untimely claims could not be
disallowed because Section 502 did not list untimely claims
as disallowable. The court held that Section 502 did not
control the limitation for filing claims under Bankr. Rule
3002. In re Osborne, 159 B.R. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1993).
The debtor had originally filed in Chapter 7 and had
given notice of the filing to the IRS which did not file a
claim. The case was converted to Chapter 13 and notice of
the conversion and bar date for claims was sent to the IRS
but the IRS had no record of receiving the notice. The IRS
filed an untimely claim in the Chapter 13 case after the plan
confirmation and the debtor petitioned for denial of the
claim. The court held that the IRS claim was barred as
untimely since the IRS knew about the bankruptcy case but
failed to file any claims. In re Messics, 159 B.R. 803
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
COMPROMISE OFFERS. The debtors had made an
offer to compromise prior to assessment of back taxes and
the compromise was rejected by the IRS. After the
assessment, IRS alleged that the debtors had made an oral
second offer of compromise and the debtors’ attorney had
sent a letter appealing the rejection of the second offer. The
court held that the first offer did not extend the period for
making pre-petition assessments under Section
507(a)(7)(A)(ii) because it occurred prior to the assessment,
the oral second offer was not a valid offer because it was not
made on IRS forms, and the appeal of the second rejection
did not constitute an offer for purposes of Section 507. In re
Aberl, 159 B.R. 792 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
JURISDICTION. Although the court held that it had
jurisdiction to hear the debtor’s petition for determination of
liability for the debtor’s spouse’s taxes, the court abstained
from exercising jurisdiction because a determination would
not benefit any creditor. In re Starnes, 159 B.R. 748
(Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1993).
SETOFF.  The IRS filed a claim for pre-petition taxes
owed by the debtor. Post-petition, the IRS discovered that a
refund was due to the debtor for another prepetition tax year
and refunded all of the refund except funds sufficient to pay
all of the debtor’s tax liability, including a post-petition
liability. The IRS informed the trustee of its intent to make
the setoffs but delayed in obtaining relief from the automatic
stay to make the setoffs. The court held that the refund was
a pre-petition debt owed to the debtor and could be setoff
against the prepetition tax liability. The violation of the
automatic stay was excused because the trustee did nothing
in reliance on the full payment of the refund. The setoff of
the refund against the post-petition tax liability was denied.
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In re Rush Hampton Indus., Inc., 159 B.R. 343 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1993).
TAX LIEN. The IRS had filed a tax lien pre-petition but
during the bankruptcy failed to list the taxes involved as
secured. The debtor’s plan provided for the sale of their
residence with the equity proceeds retained by the debtors
for payment of capital gains tax; however, the tax lien was
discovered and the IRS sought recovery of the proceeds.
The court held that the tax lien remained valid through the
bankruptcy case and was not affected by the failure to be
listed as a claim in the case or to be listed in the plan. In re
Bisch, 159 B.R. 546 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM. The
ASCS has announced plans to issue proposed regulations to
allow limited and periodic nonemergency haying and
grazing of CRP grasslands. 58 Fed. Reg. 66308 (Dec. 20,
1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations governing the Late Planting
Agreement Option. 58 Fed. Reg. 64872 (Dec. 10, 1993).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations removing late
and prevented planting coverage from the endorsement for
specific crops because the endorsement is also in the general
endorsement. 58 Fed. Reg. 64973 (Dec. 10, 1993).
DISASTER PAYMENTS-ALM § 10.03[4].* The CCC
has issued interim regulations amending the livestock
emergency programs (1) to simplify the method of
determining total livestock feed needs, (2) to change the
method of determining pasture value, (3) to apply the
$50,000 payment limitation to crop years instead of calender
years, and (4) to alter the method of calculating interest on
refunds due the CCC. 58 Fed. Reg. 62510 (Nov. 29, 1993).
FARMER-OWNED RESERVE. The CCC has adopted
as final regulations under the farmer-owned reserve (FOR)
offering producers an additional opportunity to declare
intentions for the 1992 feed grains FOR program and
allowing extensions of maturing 1990 FOR wheat loans and
1992 wheat and feed grain loans. 58 Fed. Reg. 62509 (Nov.
29, 1993).
PEANUTS. The ASCS has issued proposed regulations
setting the 1994 national peanut quota at 1,350,000 short
tons and the CCC has announced proposed regulations
setting the sales price for additional peanuts for export




CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will provided for 10 percent of the residuary
estate to be invested for three beneficiaries sufficient to
produce $300 income for each beneficiary. The will also
bequeathed the remainder of the residuary estate to a trust
for the same beneficiaries with income distributed as needed
to obtain the $300 per month income, with the remainder of
the income to be distributed to charities. The remainder of
the residuary estate passed to the charities upon the death of
the last beneficiary. The estate proposed to reform the trust
to change the beneficiaries of the ten percent investment and
to provide the three beneficiaries with income from the trust
determined as a percentage of the net value of the trust
assets with the remainder passing to the charities. The IRS
ruled that the original trust was a reformable interest and
that the reformed trust would qualify for a charitable
deduction. Ltr. Rul 9345014, Aug. 11, 1993.
The decedent’s estate included bequests to a charity of
metal furniture, 2,255 acres of farmland, farm machinery
and equipment, and other farmland which was required to
be sold. The decedent’s will provided for payment of all
estate net income to the surviving spouse during the
administration of the estate.  The IRS reasoned that the
charities had a remainder interest in the estate property
because the surviving spouse’s interest in the estate net
income could extend for four to eight years because of the
complexity of the estate. The IRS ruled that the remainder
interest in the 2,255 acres of farmland was eligible for the
charitable deduction; however, the remainder interests in the
farm machinery and equipment and the metal furniture were
not eligible for the charitable deduction. The IRS also ruled
that the remainder interest in the farmland which was to be
sold was not eligible for the charitable deduction because
the surviving spouse would be entitled to the income from
the proceeds of the sale during the administration of the
estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9347002, July 29, 1993.
The taxpayer established an irrevocable charitable lead
trust which provided for annual payments to qualified
charities of 7 percent of the net fair market value of the
trust’s assets. The grantor retained no right to alter or amend
the trust and the trustee was an independent trust company.
The IRS ruled that the transfer of property to the trust was
subject to gift tax, the trust property would not be included
in the grantor’s estate, and the trust could take a charitable
deduction for the amounts distributed to charities. Ltr. Rul.
9348012, Aug. 31, 1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s will created a trust with equal
shares for the two beneficiaries. One beneficiary died and
that share was further divided into three subtrusts. The main
trust had a provision establishing a minimum and maximum
number of individual and corporate trustees. The trust
applied to a state probate court to construe the will to
provide that the minimum and maximum restriction applied
to each share of the trust such that each separate share could
have different trustees. The IRS ruled that the construction
would not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9345018,
Aug. 18, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9345021, Aug. 12, 1993; Ltr.
Rul. 9245025, Aug. 12, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9345026, Aug. 12,
1993.
The decedent had established a trust in 1964 which
provided for separation of the trust into separate trusts for
each of the grandchildren living on the surviving spouse’s
death. The trustee had the discretionary power to distribute
all of the principal and decided to distribute all of the trusts’
property to the beneficiaries and terminate the trusts. The
IRS ruled that because the distribution was in accord with
the power given to the trustee, the distributions would not
subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9345033, Aug. 13,
1993.
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At the death of the beneficiary, the corpus of a trust not
subject to GSTT because of the incompetency exemption
was distributed to another exempt GSTT trust. The second
trust was partitioned into separate trusts for each beneficiary
with the separate trusts retaining the provisions of the
original trust, except that the trustees would no longer be
able to distribute all trust income to one beneficiary. The
IRS ruled that the new trusts were not subject to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9345034, Aug. 13, 1993.
The decedent’s will established an irrevocable trust for
three beneficiaries in 1969. The beneficiaries partitioned the
trust into three separate trusts with each trust to maintain the
provisions of the initial trust as to the passing of the
remainder interests in the trusts. The IRS ruled that the
partitioning of the trust did not subject the resulting trusts to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9347019, Aug. 27, 1993.
The grantor had created four trusts, a trust for two sets of
three beneficiaries in 1966 and a trust for the same two sets
of three beneficiaries in 1976.  Each set of beneficiaries
merged their two trusts into one trust and the IRS ruled that
(1) no gain or loss would be recognized by the merger, (2)
the basis and holding period of the trusts’ assets would pass
to the merged trusts, and (3) the merger did not subject the
trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9348029, Sept. 3, 1993.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The decedent had formed three
corporations and transferred a farm to each corporation. The
three corporations each leased at a bargain lease its farm to a
general partnership, composed of the decedent and a child
of the decedent, which operated the farms. A fourth
corporation was formed to acquire and manage oil and gas
interests owned by the decedent. The decedent made
outright gifts of the stock to various family members and the
stock had no restrictions on alienation. The IRS ruled that
the transfers of stock were gifts of present interests eligible
for the annual exclusion. Ltr. Rul. 9346003, August 9,
1993.
The decedent had executed a durable power of attorney
appointing the decedent’s child as attorney-in-fact.
Although the appointment gave the child broad powers, the
appointment did not specifically give the child the power to
make gifts. The child transferred some of the decedent’s real
property to family members without consideration. The IRS
ruled that because, under Texas law, the durable power of
attorney did not include the power to make gifts, the
transferred property was included in the decedent’s estate as
a revocable gift.  Ltr. Rul. 9347003, Aug. 5, 1993.
The decedent’s will established a charitable remainder
unitrust. The estate did not make an allocation of the GSTT
exemption; therefore, the allocation rule of I.R.C. § 2632(c)
applied. The trustee and beneficiaries sought state court
approval of an amendment to separate the trust into a trust
for skip persons and a trust for non-skip persons. The IRS
ruled that the separation would not affect the allocation of
the exemption or cause the separate trusts to be treated as
new trusts for GSTT purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9347027, Sept. 2,
1993.
GIFTS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DEATH-ALM
§ 5.02[3].*  The decedent had established a revocable trust
with the decedent as trustee and beneficiary. Within three
years before death, the decedent directed the transfer of trust
property to several individuals. The estate argued that the
transfers were only an exercise of the decedent’s right as
grantor/trustee to make distributions from the trust. The IRS
argued that the transfers were includible in the gross estate
because the transfers were relinquishments of the decedent’s
right to revoke the trust as to those assets. The court agreed
with the estate’s argument and held that the transferred
property was not includible in the decedent’s gross estate.
Est. of Barton v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-583.
LIFE INSURANCE- ALM § 5.04[1].* The decedent
was a chief executive officer of a company which merged
with a second company. The decedent made an oral
agreement with both companies to purchase the life
insurance policies on the taxpayer held by the first
company, effective with the merger date of the companies.
Shortly after the merger, the decedent transferred the
policies to the decedent’s spouse as trustee. The decedent
paid the second company the cash surrender value of the
policies with the decedent’s own funds but withdrew the
paid amount from the cash value of the policies after the
policies were transferred to the trust and within three years
before the decedent’s death. The IRS argued that the
drawdown of the cash value was an exercise of an incident
of ownership within three years of death and caused the
policies to be included in the decedent’s estate. The court
held that the decedent did not have the authority to make the
drawdown under state law; therefore, the decedent did not
possess an incident of ownership and the policies were
excludible from the estate. Est. of O’Daniel v. U.S., 93-2
U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,150 (5th Cir. 1993).
The taxpayers, husband and wife, entered into a split-
dollar life insurance agreement with their wholly-owned S
corporation and a trust for their children for ownership of a
life insurance policy on the life of the survivor of the two
taxpayers. Each taxpayer owned 50 percent of the
corporation stock which passed to the survivor in trust. The
survivor agreed to make the Subchapter S trust election. The
IRS ruled that the corporation held no incidents of
ownership in the life insurance policy and that the
Subchapter S trust election would not cause any attribution
of incidents of ownership to occur. Ltr. Rul. 9348009, Aug.
31, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed all property to a son. The son
and the surviving spouse entered into an agreement to set
aside the probate of the will and distribute all of the property
to the spouse except for $600,000 which went to the son.
The estate claimed a marital deduction for the property
which passed to the spouse and stated that no disclaimer
was made. The estate argued that the agreement was a
disclaimer by the son or that the agreement was a settlement
of a bona fide will dispute, both giving rise to a marital
deduction for the property passing to the spouse. The court
held that the agreement was not a qualified disclaimer
because the agreement directed the passing of the property
to someone other than the persons, the son’s children, who
would have received the property under the statute. In
addition, the agreement was not a settlement of a dispute but
a tax avoidance scheme because the spouse had no right
under statute to the decedent’s estate. DePaoli v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-577.
The decedent’s spouse had agreed with the decedent to
receive specific estate property at the decedent’s death;
however, after the decedent’s death, the spouse filed legal
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action to take the community share. The spouse and one of
the decedent’s children agreed to a specific transfer of
property in satisfaction of the spouse’s community share
rights. The IRS ruled that the property received by the
spouse was eligible for the marital deduction.  Ltr. Rul.
9347003, Aug. 5, 1993.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent’s estate had made the special use valuation
election for stock in a corporation which owned farmland.
The two qualified heirs signed the recapture agreement as
legatees of the stock but not as officers or shareholders of
the corporation. The IRS ruled that the election substantially
complied with the election requirements and could be
perfected within 90 days after notice from the IRS, because
under Arizona law, the heirs would be estopped from
denying knowledge of the election as officers or
shareholders of the corporation.  Ltr. Rul. 9346003, August
9, 1993.
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The decedent owned
stock in five corporations, with one corporation operating a
transfer and storage business and the other companies
owning assets leased to the first corporation. The court held
that the stock of the corporation would be valued for estate
tax purposes using the factors listed in Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 C.B. 237. The stock in the four asset owning
corporations was valued using the net asset value method.
The stock in the two corporations received a discount of 25
percent for minority ownership and all of the stock received
a 10 percent discount for lack of marketability. Est. of Ford
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-580.
The taxpayer established a revocable trust for the benefit
of the taxpayer and with the taxpayer’s spouse as trustee.
The trust provided for an annual payment in cash or
property of at least $100,000. The trust was funded with
stock which the taxpayer had the right to purchase with
substitute property. The taxpayer also had the right to
receive the amount necessary to reimburse the taxpayer for
income taxes on trust income above a certain amount. The
IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s interest in the trust was a
qualified annuity interest under I.R.C. § 2702. The IRS also
ruled that distributions of stock to the taxpayer would not be
taxable events and if the taxpayer died before the
termination of the trust, the fair market value of the trust
corpus would be includible in the taxpayer’s gross estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9345035, Aug. 13, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-ALM § 4.03[7].* The
taxpayers had loaned money to another couple who filed for
bankruptcy. The taxpayers filed an unsecured claim in the
case for the loan but the debtors were discharged with no
payment required on the taxpayers’ claim under the
bankruptcy plan. The court held that the taxpayers were
eligible for a nonbusiness bad debt deduction in the year of
the debtors’ discharge. Nova v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-563.
    DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM § 4.02[15].*
The taxpayer had entered into an agreement with a lender in
1986 to cancel a bank loan in exchange for an immediate
cash payment. The court ruled that the discharge of
indebtedness income was realized in 1987, the year the cash
was paid, and not in 1986. Shannon v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-554.
GROSS INCOME-ALM § 4.02.* The taxpayer was a
shareholder and employee of a corporation for which the
taxpayer made several business trips on airplanes. The
taxpayer would bill the corporation for first class travel but
would purchase coach fare tickets and have the tickets
upgraded to first class using frequent flyer credits. The
difference in the ticket prices would be credited to the
taxpayer’s travel account. The court held that the funds in
the account were income to the taxpayer because the
taxpayer could redeem the amount for cash or personal
travel expenses. Charley v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-
558.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was a
doctor who operated a horse farm. The court held that losses
incurred by the horse farm activity were not allowed
because the farm was not operated for profit where the farm
had suffered substantial continuing losses without much
chance of future profits. Borsody v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-534.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].*
Within one month after filing a timely income tax return, the
taxpayer discovered that all the gain from an installment
sale had been mistakenly reported as income on the return.
The taxpayer immediately requested a revocation of the
election and the IRS ruled that the revocation was granted
because the taxpayer had made an inadvertent error, the
revocation was not motivated by tax avoidance, and the
taxpayer acted expeditiously in seeking the revocation after
learning of the error. Ltr. Rul. 9345027, Aug. 12, 1993.
On December 31, 1992, the taxpayer ordered a
stockbroker to make a sale of some of the taxpayer’s stock.
The sale order was placed on that day by the broker but the
exchange of the stock for the proceeds occurred on January
8, 1993. The IRS ruled that installment reporting was not
allowed, under I.R.C. § 453(a), for sales of stock sold on an
established securities market and that the gain or loss would
be recognized in the year of the trade date, December 31,
1992.  Rev. Rul. 93-84, I.R.B. 1993-39, 5, obsoleting Rev.
Ruls. 82-227, 78-270, 70-344.
INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].*  A court has invalidated
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T as overbroad because the
regulation disallowed an interest deduction for interest paid
on underpayment of income tax regardless of the source of
the income. The holding reinstates the previous rule that
interest paid on income tax deficiencies on trade or business
income is deductible to the extent the interest is
characterized as as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. The court allowed the IRS time to discover
evidence on the issue of whether the interest paid by the
taxpayer relating to farm business income was ordinary and
necessary. Miller v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,631 (D. N.D. 1993).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04.*  The
shareholders of an S corporation owning investment tax
credit property were not required to recapture investment
tax credit when the S corporation merged with a C cor-
poration in a tax-free reorganization under Section 381(a),
because the merger was a mere change in the form of doing
business where the merged corporation carried on the same
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business with the same assets.  Giovanini v. U.S., 93-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,600 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 90-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,542 (D. Or. 1990).
LEVY. The IRS has issued tables of the amounts of
wages exempt from levy for delinquent taxes in 1994 for
various taxpayers. The tables are also published in IRS Pub.
1494.  Notice 93-59, I.R.B. 1993-39, 9.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  A partnership
with less than 10 partners who were all individuals was
excepted from the partnership audit procedures and the IRS
was not required to issue a final partnership administrative
adjustment before the Tax Court would have jurisdiction
over a deficiency determination involving a partnership loss
claimed by a partner.  McKnight v. Comm'r, 7 F.3d 447
(5th Cir. 1993), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1991-514.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The IRS has
ruled that a business organized under the Rhode Island
Limited Liability Act could be taxed as a corporation or
partnership, but would be taxed as a partnership if the
articles of organization restricted the transferability of
interests and required the dissolution of the company upon
termination of a member’s interest unless all members agree
to continue the company. Rev. Rul. 93-81, I.R.B. 1993-38,
7.
The IRS has ruled that a business organized under the
Utah Limited Liability Act could be taxed as a corporation
or partnership, but would be taxed as a partnership if (1) the
articles of organization restricted the transferability of
interests and required the dissolution of the company upon
termination of a member’s interest unless all members agree
to continue the company and (2) the articles of organization
provided for management by elected members of the
organization. Rev. Rul. 93-91, I.R.B. 1993-41, 22.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has provided a model
amendment for sponsors of master and prototype, regional
prototype, volume submitter specimen, and individually
designed profit-sharing and stock bonus plans that have
received favorable opinion, notification, advisory and
determination letters to amend their plans to reflect the
modifications made by Notice 93-26, I.R.B. 1993-18, 11 to
the 30-day notice requirement under Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-
11(c). Rev. Proc. 93-47, I.R.B. 1993-41.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that it will begin
assessing the Section 6050I intentional disregard penalties
against attorneys for failure to report transactions involving
more than $10,000 in cash on Form 8300. The IRS is
relying on court opinions holding that the information about
client related transactions are not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. IR-93-113.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations removing all
nonpayroll withheld taxes from reporting on Form 941,
Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return, and Form 941E,
Quarterly Return of Federal Income Tax and Medicare Tax.
58 Fed. Reg. 68033 (Dec. 23, 1993).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  A shareholder
of an S corporation signed a Form 872-S, Consent to Extend
the Time to Assess Tax Attributable to Items of an S
Corporation, which the corporation argued was invalid
because not signed by a Tax Matters Person (TMP). The
court held that the Form 872-S was valid because under
Oregon law and the corporation’s bylaws, the shareholder
had the authority to manage the corporation’s affairs,
including filing of tax forms. Bugaboo Timber Co. v.
Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 31 (1993).  Same as to California
law. Thermal Energy Concepts, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-541.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
January 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.98 3.94 3.92 3.91
110% AFR 4.38 4.33 4.31 4.29
120% AFR 4.79 4.73 4.70 4.68
Mid-term
AFR 5.32 5.25 5.22 5.19
110% AFR 5.86 5.78 5.74 5.71
120% AFR 6.40 6.30 6.25 6.22
Long-term
AFR 6.30 6.20 6.15 6.12
110% AFR 6.94 6.82 6.76 6.73
120% AFR 7.58 7.44 7.37 7.33
TAX RATES. The taxable income ceilings for 1994 tax
rates are (1) 15 percent: $38,000 for married couples filing
jointly,  $30,500 for heads of households, and $22,750 for
single filers; (2) 28 percent: $91,850 for joint filers, $78.700
for heads of households, and $55,100 for single filers. The
36 and 39.6 percent tax brackets will not be adjusted until
1995. The standard deductions for 1994 are $6,350 for joint
filers, $5,600 for heads of households and $3,800 for single
filers. The personal exemption is $2,450. The personal
exemption phases out beginning at $167,700 for joint filers,
$139,750 for heads of households and $111,800 for single
filers. IR-93-118.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The IRS has ruled on the
deductibility of travel expenses incurred while employed
temporarily away from the taxpayer’s home. If the taxpayer
realistically expects the temporary employment to last less
than one year and the employment does last less than one
year, the expenses are deductible. If the taxpayer
realistically expects the temporary employment to last more
than one year, the expenses are not deductible, even if the
work lasts less than one year. If the taxpayer realistically
expects the temporary employment to last less than one year
but later learns that the work will last more than one year,
the expenses are deductible only to the extent of the
expenses incurred up to the point of learning that the work
would last more than one year. Rev. Rul. 93-86, I.R.B.
1993-40.
TRUSTS-ALM Ch. 8.* The taxpayers established a
charitable unitrust and a charitable annuity trust which
complied with Rev. Proc. 90-32, 1990-1 C.B. 546 except
that the trusts provided for appointment of successor
trustees and a trustee committee with the power to change or
appoint trustees, and allowed the situs of the trusts to be
moved to another state. The IRS ruled that the differences
did not affect the qualification of the trusts for income tax
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